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Simple Summary: Scientists justify animal use in medical research because the benefits to human
health outweigh the costs or harms to animals. However, whether it is justifiable is controversial
for many people. Even public interests are divided because an increasing proportion of people do
not support animal research, while demand for healthcare that is based on animal research is also
rising. The wider public should be given more influence in these difficult decisions. This could
be through requiring explicit disclosure about the role of animals in drug labelling to inform the
public out of respect for people with strong objections. It could also be done through periodic public
consultations that use public opinion and expert advice to decide which diseases justify the use
of animals in medical research. More public input will help ensure that animal research projects
meet public expectations and may help to promote changes to facilitate medical advances that need
fewer animals.
Abstract: Current animal research ethics frameworks emphasise consequentialist ethics through
cost-benefit or harm-benefit analysis. However, these ethical frameworks along with institutional
animal ethics approval processes cannot satisfactorily decide when a given potential benefit is
outweighed by costs to animals. The consequentialist calculus should, theoretically, provide for
situations where research into a disease or disorder is no longer ethical, but this is difficult to
determine objectively. Public support for animal research is also falling as demand for healthcare
is rising. Democratisation of animal research could help resolve these tensions through facilitating
ethical health consumerism or giving the public greater input into deciding the diseases and
disorders where animal research is justified. Labelling drugs to disclose animal use and providing
a plain-language summary of the role of animals may help promote public understanding and would
respect the ethical beliefs of objectors to animal research. National animal ethics committees could
weigh the competing ethical, scientific, and public interests to provide a transparent mandate for
animal research to occur when it is justifiable and acceptable. Democratic processes can impose ethical
limits and provide mandates for acceptable research while facilitating a regulatory and scientific
transition towards medical advances that require fewer animals.
Keywords: animal ethics; consequentialism; harm-benefit analysis; justification; democratisation;
ethical consumerism; animal ethics committees
1. Introduction
Animal research is frequently considered justifiable based on a consequentialist calculus that
invokes cost-benefit or harm-benefit analysis [1]. These ethical frameworks are formalised throughout
the developed world with explicit statements in regulations and guidelines requiring researchers
to justify their use of animals based on benefits to humans, animals, or the environment. These
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frameworks rely on researchers presenting evidence that their research may lead to benefits, such as
addressing an unmet medical need, but many members of the public disagree. Opinion polls in the
US and the UK show that the proportion of adults who believe medical research involving animals is
morally acceptable has been falling since 2002 [2]. However, this trend in public opinion is at odds with
the rising demand for healthcare [3], including drugs that are tested on animals as part of regulatory
requirements [4]. Despite the trend in public opinion, current ethical and regulatory frameworks
lack the capacity to reduce the scope and volume of animal research because the consequentialist
calculus is too rough and imprecise. Options for democratising animal research ethics should be
considered, including drug labelling to educate the public and public consultation by national animal
ethics committees to engage the public in deciding when animal research is justified.
2. Ethical Flexibility
The research community has largely adopted the consequentialist ethics that were used to shift
attitudes against animal research. In the 1970s, Peter Singer famously argued that the suffering of
animals should not be given less weight than the suffering of humans, a view that he believed should
end the vast majority of animal research [5,6]. However, others have argued that animal research is
necessary to maximise goods and avoid harms [7]. Indeed, the benefits of animal research are the
primary argument advanced by scientists who use animals [8], even though moral philosophers
as varied as deontologists, ecofeminists, and virtue ethicists may find it unconvincing [9–12].
The consequentialist framework has now broadly been adopted by the research community, with
animals given ethical standing and being included in cost-benefit rubrics. Animal ethics processes
require justification for research projects (benefit) and address costs by embedding the 3Rs of
replacement, reduction, and refinement into regulations and guidelines [13]. However, animal research
continues, leaving its opponents dissatisfied.
One issue is that the calculation of ethical costs to animals and the benefits of animal research are
so rough and imprecise (if they are even possible) [6,14] that they can lead to almost any conclusion.
An optimist could argue that since a particular improvement in healthcare could benefit humans in
perpetuity, but takes only a finite number of animals to achieve, almost any project could be justifiable.
Moreover, the practical benefits of a research project, like the results of individual experiments, are
hard to predict and may be more useful than anticipated. For example, in 2016, there were eight
first-in-class drugs approved that perhaps may not have been possible without animal use (see
Table 1) [15]. Opponents of animal research place less weight on the benefits and greater weight on the
costs [11], or criticise researchers for having the opposite bias [14]. The flexibility and imprecision of
the consequentialist calculus makes it very difficult to reject projects on ethical grounds, provided they
have a properly articulated rationale.
In theory, there should be a point where the benefit side of the consequentialist calculus
is outweighed by the costs to the animals. If it were possible to quantify a benefit, at least in
health, it should probably be based on the World Health Organization’s measure of disease burden,
disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs). Moral philosophers, however, have argued that certain
conditions should not be targeted based on the quality of the disorder or disease being researched,
rather than the quantity of the benefit. For example, the ethics of better therapies for insomnia or
experiments in psychology have been questioned [11,14], despite the fact that psychological disorders
account for about a quarter of Europe’s DALYs [16]. In fact, in 2015, depression was the 10th biggest
contributor to disease burden, with 12 million DALYs lost [17]. Even if it is assumed that all of the
50–100 million vertebrates used in experiments per year [18,19] are used for the development of 30
new drugs [15], the 169 million DALYs lost to mental and substance use disorders [17] eclipses the
2–3 million animals each new drug requires on average. Although the consequentialist calculus is
supposedly a quantitative exercise [14], no regulatory guidelines or ethics committees have been
reported to utilise a cut-off based on DALYs or any other objective measure for approving projects.
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Table 1. Basic and preclinical animal research and first-in-class drugs approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration in 2016.
Trade Name (Drug) Disease Animal Use
Defitelio (defibrotide sodium) Hepatic veno-occlusive diseaseafterhaematopoietic stem cell transplantation *
Derived from the intestinal mucosa of pigs, defibrotide has been tested in
several cell lines and in animals, such as mice [20–22].
Exondys 51 (eteplirsen) Duchenne muscular dystrophy *
Eteplirsen works by causing exon skipping to correct a genetic mutation.
Animal studies on the approach used mice and dogs [23]. However, its
approval using a surrogate marker of efficacy in humans is controversial [24].
Ocaliva (obeticholic acid) Primary biliary cirrhosiss * Obeticholic acid is a farnesoid-X receptor agonist. The farnesoid-X receptorwas recommended as a drug target based on studies in rats [25–27].
Spinraza (nusinersen) Spinal muscular atrophy *
Nusinersen (like eteplirsen) works by modulating gene splicing to increase
levels of a protein affected by an inherited genetic mutation. It was advanced
to clinical trials based on work in mice and non-human primates [28–30].
Venclexta (venetoclax) Chronic lymphocytic leukemia * Targets the Bcl2 receptor, based on basic research into apoptosis and mousecancer models [31–33].
Xiidra (lifitegrast) Dry eye disease
Dry eye disease can affect animals like dogs, cats, and horses and animal
models have provided evidence of an inflammatory role. Lifitegrast reduces
inflammation by preventing LFA-1/ICAM-1 interactions and has been tested
indogs and mice [34–36].
Zinbryta (daclizumab) Multiple sclerosis
Daclizumab was originally developed as immune suppressant for transplant
patients and based on studies in mice showing mechanisms to suppress
autoimmune responses. Human clinical studies facilitated its translation for
multiple sclerosis [37,38].
Zinplava (bezlotoxumab) Clostridium difficile infection
Bezlotoxumab neutralises C. difficile toxin B. Early work involved
characterising the effect of toxin B in animals like hamsters and rabbits and
using rabbits to generate antibodies against toxin B [39–41].
* “Orphan” or rare diseases affecting fewer than 200,000 Americans often have limited treatment options or no drug treatment available.
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Alternative Ethical Frameworks
There are alternative ethical frameworks to consequentialism, but these have not been formally
adopted and leave the question of justifiability contested. Deontological or rights-based frameworks
and virtue ethics frameworks may also still consider consequences. In the extreme, a rights-based
framework calls for the total abolition of all animal research, as Tom Regan argued based on the
idea that animals have inherent value as living creatures [42]. However, a minimalist view of animal
rights would be that animals should have the right to freedom from “useless pain or misery” [43].
The usefulness of the animal’s suffering here invokes consequentialism—it is the benefit for science
and health that permits the research. Rights-based frameworks have also struggled to gain formal
acceptance as courts have struggled with the idea of granting rights to animals [44], so though the
framework may have philosophical value, few animal ethics systems formally adopt the principle.
Similarly, virtue ethicists may argue that animal research is cruel and therefore immoral, using
reasoning that is similar to consequentialist approaches [10]. However, it can also be argued that animal
research is compassionate when conducted for the purposes of improving healthcare, perhaps based on
discounting animal interests because of partiality to other human ties [9,45], but this potentially leaves
virtue ethics in a similar impasse to consequentialism as individuals must weigh their compassion
for patients against compassion for animals. There is as yet no ethical framework that can clearly and
uncontroversially delineate justifiable and unjustifiable research in a way that is significantly more
satisfactory from a philosophical and practical perspective.
3. Consequentialism and Public Interest
The conclusions of different consequentialist philosophers, scientists and perceptions of the public
are often in disagreement. Scientists often argue that a study is justifiable because there is unmet
medical need, but it is unclear whether members of the public (or consequentialist philosophers) would
agree that every unmet medical need warrants the use of animals in medical research. In general,
a majority of people believe animal research is ethically acceptable [2,46], but this includes no
fine-grained information about particular conditions or approaches. A purely consequentialist ethical
approach would probably target research funding in accordance with burden of each disease or
disorder, but that is not the case in reality. Instead, funding for research into different disorders
is skewed by societal attitudes, with certain medical conditions attracting an excess of funding
while others are underfunded relative to their disease burden [47–49]. Societal attitudes are also
less supportive of certain techniques, like genetic modification, in animal research [50].
The public might consider other factors when deciding whether animal research is acceptable
for a particular condition. For example, it may be seen as more justifiable to use animals to improve
treatments for conditions that affect earlier stages of life rather than later stages because there
is potentially a greater benefit. Disorders that are perceived to have an element of choice, like
addiction [51], could also conceivably be seen as less ethical choices for animal use in medical research.
However, people with addiction still seek treatment, including medication, and this demand for new,
more effective treatments has previously been argued as a justification for further research [52].
The public’s demand for healthcare continues to rise suggesting a strong public interest in
maintaining and improving current standards. Healthcare spending is rising at a rate above
inflation, with large increases in pharmaceutical spending [3,53]. Interviews with stakeholders about
pharmaceuticals policy show that they are also concerned about equitable access, for instance patients
with rare disorders [54]. Rare (or “orphan”) disorders pose a difficulty for consequentialist ethics
because benefits are accrued by a smaller number of people, thus shifting the consequentialist calculus
against lines of research. These rare diseases may have no effective therapies available and thus
attract significant sympathy and political advocacy, as was the case for the controversial approval of
eteplirsen [55]. Therefore, it appears that the public places at least some weight on the more abstract
benefit of equitable access to healthcare that may impact or override an otherwise unfavourable
consequentialist calculus.
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Evaluations of animal research ethics must therefore weigh a multitude of competing viewpoints.
Surveys have shown that public opinion is turning against animal research, with support dropping
from 75% to 66% in the UK and from 63% to 51% in the US between 2002 and 2016 [2,46]. One
Canadian survey also found minority (44%) public support for animal research that benefitted humans
but harmed animals. Respondents were then presented with simplified typical arguments against
animal research and virtually all undecided individuals were convinced animal research should
not be supported [56]. On the other hand, the behaviour of the public in seeking healthcare and
demanding new therapies, sometimes before they have been clinically tested [57], suggests that
(insofar as animal research is currently necessary for drug development) there is an indirect public
interest in continuing to do animal research. Although some philosophers argue that all medical
research could be done morally in humans or using alternatives, scientists have consistently argued
that animals are currently necessary to make medical advances [8,58]. If it continues, animal activists
will continue to campaign against their work, potentially using aggressive protest techniques like
targeting individual scientists [46,59]. Democratisation can help society navigate the uncertainty of the
consequentialist calculus and balance it with other public interest considerations through individual
action and enhanced opportunities for deliberative participation [60].
4. Ethical Health Consumerism
One form of democratisation is through ethical consumerism. Moral philosophers have previously
argued for changes in individual behaviour to improve the treatment of animals. For example,
consequentialists and virtue ethicists have made arguments to support vegetarianism because
withdrawing support for the meat industry can either help reduce animal suffering or is otherwise
compassionate and generous [10,61,62]. There is also historical precedent for similar actions in
healthcare. For example, in early 19th century Britain, doctors who performed vivisection were
subject to boycotts out of fear that they lacked sensitivity and compassion [63].
In the late 20th century, it was suggested (perhaps sarcastically) that patients concerned with
animal research should give their doctor an advanced directive refusing treatments derived from
animal research, i.e., all of them [64]. More recently, it was proposed to label medicines in the UK
as tested on animals to inform the public of the role of preclinical animal work [65]. However,
animal activists opposed the labelling initiative, citing concerns that patients may not comply with
medication because it had been tested on animals and arguing that animal research made no meaningful
contribution to drug development anyway [66]. In the same vein, animal activists have also argued
(as a reductio ad absurdum) that supporters of animal research should volunteer to be experimented
upon should they lose mental capacity [67].
However, the application of ethical consumerism to healthcare has the capacity to inform the
public and to democratise the consideration of the consequentialist calculus. Non-compliance with
medication may be a concern for clinicians, but refusing treatment is well within a patient’s rights [68].
There is currently no external labelling indicating that a given drug was tested on animals and no
further information in the product information sheet. Moreover, current labels do not even provide
adequate information for the 5–10% of patients who are vegetarian or vegan about the suitability of
a drug’s ingredients [69]. Given the state of public opinion, opening healthcare to ethical consumerism
through labelling and disclosure can instead be seen as a means of respecting the ethical views of
a significant minority of the population. Currently, adult patients with decision-making capacity can
refuse treatments that are inconsistent with their religious, ethical, or other personal beliefs [70,71].
Non-disclosure regarding the role of animals in a treatment’s development implicitly denies the
validity of patients’ ethical beliefs and their right to give informed consent or refusal.
Objections to Ethical Health Consumerism
Animal activists have argued that a simple external label may not be sufficient on its own [66],
but the proposal could be refined by requiring pharmaceutical companies to provide a plain-language
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summary of the role animals have played in a drug’s development. Surveys have also been cited
suggesting that pharmaceutical companies only do animal research to satisfy regulators [72]. On the
other hand, industry studies suggest that results from animals are imprecise, but still useful predictors
of the likelihood of adverse outcomes in clinical trials [73,74]. Since the reliability and usefulness
of animal results differs based on circumstances (e.g., species and organ) [73], the pharmaceutical
company that developed the drug is best-placed to summarise the role of animal research for an
individual drug. However, care must be taken by regulators when reviewing these statements because
there have been cases of researchers selectively reporting data from animal research that results in
ineffective or unsafe compounds proceeding to clinical trials [75,76] just as regulators must take care
to ensure clinical trials are well designed [77]. Requiring labelling and a plain-language summary of
the role of animals in a drug’s development could help the public understand the contribution that
animals have made and to then evaluate whether the benefits to them have outweighed to costs to
the animals.
Research on consumer behaviour suggests clinician and animal activist concerns about medical
non-compliance or refusal are not likely to be a major issue. Consumer behaviour is affected by many
factors other than ethical labels [78,79]. The expression of ethical concerns does not necessarily translate
into changes in behaviour and consumers who do change their behaviour represent a minority [78].
For example, one study found an ‘organic’ label had no significant effect on choice of chocolate [80].
However, this has not prevented several ethical consumer movements targeting animal welfare and
environmental issues, such as egg-laying hens, from achieving some success [81–83].
Moral philosophers have also questioned the possibility of refraining from being a party to animal
research. It has been argued that animal research is too deeply entrenched in corporate and academic
research centres for individuals to withdraw their support with any hope of affecting change [10].
However, a small minority of patients who demand an alternative type of care can help drive change,
such as with the development of bloodless medicine for Jehovah’s Witnesses [84]. Moderates concerned
with animal use could approach the issue by accepting life-saving treatments, but refusing non-critical
treatments and ensuring they implement an advance care directive to limit the amount of medical care
they receive if they lose decision-making capacity. Even a small number of animal research objectors
could be enough to encourage the regulatory and scientific developments needed for animal-free
medical advances.
5. Participatory Decision-Making: Are National Animal Ethics Committees Needed?
Another process for democratising the consequentialist calculus of animal research is to give
the public direct input into deliberative processes [60]. Researchers have variously argued for
enhanced approaches to project assessment [18] and for political processes as necessary for the
determination of what research is acceptable [85]. Electoral and parliamentary processes can initiate
change, but legislation banning animal research is too blunt and inflexible to incorporate society’s
diverse views on animal research and the varying circumstances for different conditions. Fine-grained
information about what kinds of research are acceptable is necessary to ensure that animal research
meets public expectations.
Current institutional ethics review processes have been criticised because they do not adequately
ensure that animal research is valid or ethical. For example, they may not adequately assess the
scientific validity of a project before giving approval [86] and many animal welfare officers at Australian
and Dutch universities feel that 3Rs opportunities remain unused [87,88]. There are also anecdotal
reports that rejection of projects at the ethics committee stage never or almost never happens [89].
This suggests that the animal research approval processes used at the institutional level for individual
projects are incapable of determining when animal costs outweigh potential benefits.
A national animal ethics committee, organised by funders and/or regulators, could democratically
engage the public and weigh scientific evidence to determine what kinds of animal research are
acceptable. Historically, these kinds of ‘boundary organisations’ have sat at the intersection of science
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and politics and help to resolve competing or opposing interests while simultaneously pursuing
both [90,91]. The challenge is in designing a deliberative space or process that can adequately
communicate science and give the public an appropriate degree of influence on decision-making [92].
Although there is already some democratisation of animal ethics procedures with independent or
unaffiliated members being included in institutional animal ethics committees in several jurisdictions,
the effectiveness of these roles has been criticised for lacking in independence or representativeness [89].
There are also challenges in terms of education and training and the inherent difficulty of representing
the views of a public that is divided on animal research [93]. A national animal ethics committee could
overcome some of these difficulties through standard public consultation processes (e.g., surveys,
hearings, written submissions) and allow institutional animal ethics committees to focus on issues
with individual projects rather than resolving macro-level ethical and public interest issues. Public
engagement with these processes could be built through programs like the Concordat on Openness on
Animal Research in the UK, which encourages signatories to better communicate their use of animals
(including its limitations) through annual reporting and making online statements about their animal
use and policies [94]. Public participants in surveys, focus groups, or hearings, may then be more
engaged and educated about the issue.
The ongoing deadlock between animal activists and researchers suggests that animal research is
a good candidate for participatory decision-making [95]. If public opinion follows current trends [2],
then the deadlock and hostility towards scientists will only worsen over time. It may be costly because
every citizen is potentially a stakeholder due to an interest in either healthcare or animal welfare,
but online participation can reduce costs. Conducting surveys of representative samples can also help
to reduce costs while providing accurate information on public opinion and reducing vulnerability
to political campaigns. Animal research ethics may also require participants to understand highly
technical concepts, but the issue could also attract many passionate patient advocates and animal
activists which could ameliorate these difficulties through public education [95]. Moreover, both sides
stand to benefit. Scientists would have an explicit democratic mandate to conduct particular lines of
research. Objectors to animal research would, subject to current trends in public opinion, be able to
gradually decrease the use of animals in research and lobby for changes like repealing requirements to
use animals in drug development or increasing funding for 3Rs developments.
6. Accelerating Ethical Progress
The democratisation of decisions about animal research is a logical consequence of the general
democratisation of science. As science becomes more open (e.g., through open access and open data
practices) and participatory (e.g., citizen science), it is reasonable that information and decision-making
processes about basic research should also be more available. Democratisation can improve animal
research ethics because it will provide a process for clearly delineating justifiable and unjustifiable uses
of animals and is likely to accelerate 3Rs implementation. Similarly, drug labelling with plain language
summaries of the usefulness (and limitations) of preclinical animal research can help to educate the
public about the role of animal research in their lives. This enables individuals to make decisions
consistent with their ethical beliefs about their healthcare and refusals on ethical grounds can help
accelerate improvements in animal welfare principles such as the 3Rs. If data on the rate at which
patients refuse treatments on ethical grounds is collected, it can discourage researchers and biomedical
companies from developing treatments that the public finds ethically unacceptable. It can also raise
awareness in patients, who can use their powerful lobbying and advocacy groups to push for political
changes such as repealing the regulatory requirement to test drugs on animals, as they have done with
right-to-try laws [57].
Direct consultation and participatory decision-making through national animal ethics committees
would likely be framed (at least initially) in consequentialist terms—cost or harm-benefit—and would
require transparent weightings for different interests or viewpoints (e.g., biomedical scientists, patients,
public opinion). Over time, it would be expected that the number of lines of animal research that would
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be considered acceptable would decrease. This would occur as long as the public is given genuine
influence over decisions because current trends in public opinion show increasing opposition to animal
research [2,46]. Scientists would also need explicit protections from sudden changes in sentiment, such
as grandfathering of ethical approvals for already funded or reviewed projects and limits to the rate of
change that could suddenly impact the biomedical workforce. However, the effect of democratisation
and current trends would be to benefit animals who would be used in fewer experiments, patients
who want to receive treatments consistent with their ethical beliefs, and scientists who will have some
certainty that if they are working on animal projects that they have a democratic mandate to do so.
Political engagement with animal research is already promoting improved animal welfare.
For example, political engagement and regulatory developments in Europe are already pushing
scientists to develop and improve animal welfare standards [96]. Political and regulatory pressure
must also be accompanied by the necessary resources to study and improve animal welfare, which may
be very scarce in a regulatory and funding system focused primarily on human health needs. While
practical scientific impediments to eliminating animal research completely may continue for some
time, such as the impossibility of understanding behavioural processes without animals [8], increasing
the level of information available to the public and their ability to participate in decision-making
about the animal research that their governments support is likely to accelerate implementation of
3Rs principles.
7. Conclusions
The current consequentialist ethical framework and institutional approval processes for animal
research cannot satisfactorily resolve the question of when animal costs outweigh potential human
benefits. The consequentialist calculus is too rough and imprecise to produce clear, reproducible
conclusions and the result is that there is a significant divide within and between public opinion on
animal research, public demand for healthcare, and scientific opinion. Methods of democratisation
can help stakeholders with diverse and conflicting viewpoints give input into what kinds of benefits
may justify the use of animals in research. Facilitating ethical health consumerism through labelling
disclosure of animal use in the development of drugs or convening a national animal ethics committee
to determine which purposes are acceptable can provide the fine-grained data required to guide animal
researchers to the most ethical projects. Democratising deliberations on the justifiability of animal
research can help ensure that the interests of animal researchers and animal activists are balanced in
accordance with public expectations and can potentially facilitate changes that would enable medical
advances that use fewer animals.
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